原作者为北朝punishiment
地址：http://bbs.northernbbs.com/forum.php?mod=viewthread&tid=634292

按：先看到了这个帖子
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觉得此人甚对胃口，于是搜了同一作者的其他文章，挑了一篇讲美国对乌克兰政策的翻译。这篇主旨是喷另外一篇主张向乌克兰提供武器的智库报告。标题“How to Start a Proxy War with Russia”是典型的英语反讽修辞，讽刺该报告给出的愚蠢建议是要跟俄国打一场代理人战争，故译为“如何与俄国陷入一场代理人战争”。原文地址：http://nationalinterest.org/feat... xy-war-russia-12187
为便于阅读，英语原文部分使用白色，如对翻译有疑问可选中空白部分查看原文。译文用红字标出高能吐槽段落。
On Wednesday, Ashton Carter, the president’s nominee for Secretary of Defense, made headlines when he told Congress that he was “very much inclined” to arm the Ukrainian troops in order to combat pro-Russian rebels.
上周三，总统提名的国防部长阿什顿·卡特搞了个大新闻：他告诉国会，他“非常倾向于”武装乌克兰军队，以打击亲俄反政府武装。
Carter isn’t alone in this regard. The release of a report this week calling for a vast expansion of U.S. military aid to Ukraine, titled “Preserving Ukraine’s Independence, Resisting Russian Aggression,” helped reignite the debate in Washington, D.C. on the provision of lethal weapons and a reassessment of the U.S. role in the conflict. The authors are prominent former diplomats and highly respected members of the national-security establishment, including Michele Flournoy, Strobe Talbott and Steven Pifer, amongst others. As a result, the president’s administration has come under heavy political pressure to reevaluate the existing policy of support for Ukraine. The prominence and experience of the political figures behind this report makes it impossible to ignore. It is a concise piece of argument, demanding the United States supply $1 billion per year in defense articles to Ukraine, ranging from anti-tank missiles to advanced air defense, and a variety of technical enablers for the Ukrainian military.
在这方面，卡特不是一个人在作战。本周发布的一份题为《维护乌克兰独立，抵抗俄国侵略》的报告，呼吁大幅扩大美国对乌克兰军事援助，为重启华盛顿关于提供致命武器和重新评估美国在冲突中的角色的争论作出了贡献。该报告的作者包括米歇尔·弗卢努瓦，塔尔博特和史蒂芬皮弗之流，不乏著名的前外交官和国家安全部门广受尊重的前辈。该报告给奥巴马政府带来了沉重的政治压力，要求重新评估现行对乌克兰的帮扶政策。出炉这份报告的政治人物的权威和经验使得它难以忽略。简而言之，该报告要求美国每年向乌克兰军队提供十亿美元国防物资，从反坦克导弹到先进防空系统，以及其他各式关键技术装备。
The proponents of this armaments proposal have treated support for arming Ukraine as a litmus test for supporting Ukraine in its hour of need. But this is a false equivalence. In fact, it is entirely reasonable to support Ukraine fully and simultaneously oppose sending additional weapons into a volatile conflict region. Indeed, the proposed arms shipments would do little to help Ukraine militarily and might actually worsen the situation. Kyiv is in desperate need of financial, technical and political support to achieve vital objectives, which include a fledgling reform agenda and negotiating a durable settlement to hold the country together. This in fact is the position adopted by Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany and other U.S./NATO allies.
这一军备提案的拥趸们把是否支持武装乌克兰当成了“是否愿意在危难关头支持乌克兰”的站队。但是，这是一个并不存在的站队。事实上，完全可以在全力支持乌克兰的同时反对增派武器进入动荡冲突地区。事实上，这份送装备提案无助于军事上帮助乌克兰，而且实际上可能使局势恶化。基辅迫切需要的是资金，技术和政治支持以帮助挽救它火烧眉毛的问题，比如一套刚刚起步的政府改革工作表，或者挽救该国免于迅速四分五裂。这实际上也是德国总理默克尔和其他美国/北约盟国所采取的立场。
Sending a mix of weapons to Ukraine is unlikely to improve the situation, given the overwhelming force-on-force mismatch the country faces against Russia, but it could add fuel to a fire that is steadily consuming the country’s chances of emerging as a new nation on a European path. Instead, the United States should provide equipment and supplies to sustain Ukraine’s fledgling military, save lives, double down on economic aid and increase efforts aimed at reforming the country. Ukraine needs a genuine army, not weapons. Creating a sustainable professional force in Ukraine is a long-term effort the West must undertake as part of an overall strategy for the country, and perhaps under the framework of a strategic partnership that should emerge from thought and deliberation. Sending weapons in and of itself is not a strategy, either for Ukraine, or for settling the conflict. The United States must focus on achieving a durable political settlement first. This report does not offer recommendations on a path to peace, and no explanation of how weapons shipments could result in a political settlement to the war currently raging in the Donbass.
鉴于该国军力相对俄罗斯压倒性的不堪一击，给乌克兰送去一批武器组合难以使情况改观，倒是很可能火上浇油，把该国通向欧盟国家的未来烧个精光。与此相反，美国应该采取的政策是向乌军提供救急设备和补给，同时加大经济援助以及旨在推进该国改革的努力。乌克兰需要的是一支能打的军队，而不是武器。在乌克兰建立一支并非朝不保夕的职业武装是西方必须为该国谋求的长远规划的一部分，或许甚至应该在达成一个稳妥的战略伙伴关系的框架以后再讨论这个问题。送装备本身谈不上是一种策略，既不能救乌克兰，又不能平息冲突。美国必须首先关注实现持久的政治解决。这份报告既说不出如何实现和平，又没有讲明白为何武器装备可以从政治上解决目前肆虐在顿巴斯的战火。

At its essence, the report is intended to press the reluctant president into changing his course in Ukraine, and to make the United States a more active participant in the conflict. Its core premise is that by giving Ukraine the ability to kill more Russian soldiers, sending weapons would raise the costs of war for Moscow to an unacceptable level, thus forcing Russia to abandon its existing policy and thus deterring further aggression. The weakness in the armaments proposal is that it offers no vision for what a new political settlement to the current conflict might look like, or how to move beyond the failed Minsk ceasefire, but recommends an Afghanistan-like approach to dealing with the Russian invasion. This document advocates in no subtle terms for the United States to undertake a proxy war with Russia in Ukraine, and to supply the country with weapons equivalent to half of its current defense budget. It represents an important perspective in the policy debate of how to best help Ukraine, and merits thorough analytical consideration.
从本质上讲，这份报告旨在向不愿意介入乌克兰冲突的总统施压来改变他的政策，从而使美国积极地参与冲突。它的核心前提是，送给乌军武器可以给予乌克兰杀死更多的俄罗斯士兵的能力，从而把战争的代价提高到莫斯科不可接受的水平，从而迫使俄罗斯放弃其现行政策，从而阻止进一步的侵略。这一军备方案的弱点是，它说不出什么样的政治妥协能解决现有冲突，或者如何走出明斯克停火协议失败的阴影，而只是建议用阿富汗方案处理俄罗斯入侵问题。这份文件公然主张美国在乌克兰与俄罗斯打一场代理人战争，并向乌克兰提供价值其目前国防预算的一半的武器。这一建议代表了援助乌克兰政策辩论中的一个重要观点，值得彻底分析。
One of the problems in the report’s argumentation is that it lists a series of fears and anxieties regarding Russia’s territorial ambitions as part of its policy-justification set. Analysis of Russia’s annexation of Crimea has shown that the operation was inherently unique and could not be repeated elsewhere in Europe, while Moscow has demonstrated little interest in spontaneously invading NATO countries. On the contrary, previous references regarding the Russian world, or Novorossiya, have already been eliminated from official rhetoric. Real ultranationalists in Russia are suppressed by the government, which does not plan to realize their ambitions.
该报告所持观点的一大问题是，它试图靠一大堆对俄罗斯的领土野心的恐慌来证明需要对俄国侵略来个当头一棒。然而针对俄罗斯吞并克里米亚的的分析表明，该行动本身是独特的，无法在欧洲其他地方重复，而莫斯科已经证明它对主动入侵北约国家的兴趣不大。与此相反，莫斯科现已不再在其官方文件中使用“俄罗斯世界”或“新俄罗斯”（Novorossiya）之类字眼。俄罗斯政府压制了该国真正的极端民族主义分子，并不打算实现他们的领土野心。
Russia has shown no desire for a broader invasion of Ukraine, either, although it has the means, and the report confirms that Ukrainian officials believe a large-scale attack to create a land corridor to Crimea is highly unlikely. This was always improbable from the perspective of military science, and continues to be so. Russian actions suggest a calibrated economy of force effort to press Ukraine into accepting the breakaway separatist regions, and securing Moscow’s influence in the country. Sending weapons into the conflict today cannot be justified by the specters of early 2014, when alarmism reigned and fears of further Russian ambitions dominated Europe. Those fears have proved largely unfounded as we head into 2015.
尽管并非无力入侵，俄国并未表现出扩大入侵的意愿。该报告本身也证实了乌克兰官员自己也不相信俄国会发动一场大规模的进攻来打通通向克里米亚的陆上走廊。这从军事科学的角度本来就是不大可能的，未来也不会改变。俄国用行动表明它正通过一场精确计算的施压来迫使乌克兰接受割据地区的事实分裂，并保证莫斯科在该国的影响力。即便是2014年年初，危机论大行其道、欧洲国家纷纷恐慌俄国领土野心继续膨胀的时候，武器援乌论就不能成立。当我们进入2015年，连这些恐慌本身都被证明大多并无真凭实据。
The report also casts allusions to supposed U.S. credibility issues, and commitments to Ukraine’s security, if weapons are not provided. In reality, the United States has absolutely no obligations to Ukraine’s security under any type of accord or framework, including the Budapest Memorandum. Despite this, the United States has very vocally supported Ukraine’s new government, its territorial integrity and its European choice, along with providing economic and nonlethal military assistance. Staking U.S. credibility on the provision of military aid, while Germany continues to see the provision of lethal assistance as the wrong policy, is a dubious proposition. Berlin is disinclined to abet a proxy war in place of a political solution. American credibility is not on the line in what is first and foremost a European effort, especially when Berlin refuses to see such policies as viable. Instead, Western credibility as a whole should be tested by the commitment to aid Ukraine over the long term, and help Kyiv maintain a democratic and European path.
该报告还暗示说如果不向乌克兰提供武器，美国信誉以及乌克兰安全承诺会出问题。然而现实是，美国绝对没有在任何协议或框架中对乌克兰的安全负起任何义务，其中包括布达佩斯备忘录。尽管如此，美国非常明确的支持了乌克兰新政府，支持该国领土完整和它加入欧盟的选择，还提供了经济和非致命武器援助。在德国一直视军事援助为不可取的情况下，主张把美国的信誉押到提供军事援助上是一个大可质疑的提案。与政治解决方案相比，柏林并不愿意教唆乌克兰打一场代理人战争。在这场首先是欧洲付出的努力中，美国的信誉并非首当其冲，在柏林始终拒绝承认这一的政策的可行时尤其如此。相反，作为一个整体的西方的信誉应以长期援助乌克兰，并帮助基辅维护民主和欧洲道路的承诺为准。
The recommendations for providing Ukraine with specific military capabilities are also unlikely to prove effective. Experts familiar with the reasons for Ukraine’s military defeat understand that it is not due to technical deficits, although those exist across the board in its armed forces, but because its army as a whole is not a capable force. It lacks logistics, training, commanders with experience at maneuvering brigade- or battalion-sized elements, any coordination between volunteer battalions and regular forces, along with independent military analysis of the problems. There is no intelligence, no mobile reserves, no unified command and a political leadership that often seems disconnected from the facts on the ground. Dumping weapons into this operating environment is unlikely to prove a solution to the problems, all of which are fundamental and structural. The only thing clear in this conflict is that Ukraine stands no chance of defeating Russian forces, or the separatists, and that military escalation is a disproportionately losing proposition for Kyiv.
报告中关于给予乌克兰特定的军事能力的建议也不太可能生效。熟悉乌克兰军事失败原因的专家们明白，乌军失败并非由于它存在技术缺陷（尽管乌克兰武装部队到处都是技术缺陷），而是由于乌克兰陆军整体上不是一支能打仗的队伍。它缺乏后勤，缺乏训练，缺乏有指挥旅或营级规模机动经验的指挥官，缺乏志愿营和正规部队之间的任何协调，还缺乏对这些问题的独立分析。它没有情报收集，没有动员后备部队，没有统一的指挥，倒是有一个经常看来不通下情的政治领导阶层。往这么一个操作环境中倾倒武器不太可能成功解决这些基本问题和结构性缺陷。在这场冲突中唯一明确的事情是，乌克兰毫无可能击败俄罗斯军队或分裂分子，让这场冲突升级对基辅来说稳赔不赚。

The report reveals that Ukraine lacks any real intelligence or reconnaissance on the ground, and that its assessments of the number of Russian forces in the conflict are in stark disagreement with actual intelligence conducted by NATO. The numbers are incoherent, they vary wildly depending on the Ukrainian adviser you talk to, and most importantly, are not in alignment with U.S./NATO data. The only visible agreement between NATO and Ukraine on the composition of separatist forces appears to be that the overwhelming majority of fighters are locals and likely Ukrainian citizens, which completely undermines the premise of the entire report that Russian forces are the key participants and their casualties will prove a deterrent.
该报告披露，乌克兰在前线缺乏任何真正的情报或侦察，而该国估计的参与冲突的俄罗斯军队的数量的与北约实际掌握的情报之间有天壤之别。他们提供的数字彼此毫无联系，每个乌克兰顾问都会给你一个与众不同的数字，而最重要的是所有这些数字都与美国/北约掌握的数据相矛盾。北约和乌克兰之间唯一对的上的估计是分裂分子武装似乎绝大多数由当地居民和乌克兰公民组成，这一情况倒是完全破坏了整个报告“俄罗斯军队是关键的参与者；他们的伤亡会构成威慑”的前提。
NATO’s estimates generally show a few thousand Russian advisers and experts, while Ukrainian intelligence, which has no technical reconnaissance means, claims up to 400 Russian tanks and 10,000 Russian soldiers currently involved in the conflict. These numbers are so fantastical in range, that they suggest there is an entire Russian armored division fighting in Ukraine, perhaps even two, that have gone unnoticed by U.S. satellites (note Russia’s 4th Guards Division only has 300 tanks and 12,000 personnel required to field them). How can intelligent decisions be made on what weapons to send Ukraine when Kyiv visibly does not know what the Russian forces are, where they are and how many of them there are?
北约的估计通常是几千名俄国军事顾问和专家；而乌克兰情报部门——在没有技术侦察手段的情况下——宣称高达400辆俄国坦克和一万名俄国士兵正参与冲突。这一数字范围有多荒唐？它表示有一个甚至可能是两个完整的俄国装甲师（要知道俄国第四近卫坦克师才只有300辆坦克，而且它还需要一万两千人才能部署这三百辆坦克）躲过了美国卫星的监视在乌克兰打仗。如果基辅明显不知道俄国派出了哪些部队，他们在哪里，他们有多少人，送给乌军武器的决策又怎能是明智的？

The authors also advocate for strategic air defense, even though one of the few areas where Ukraine’s military remains effective is precisely in air defense, from mobile Osa and Buk systems to strategic S200 and S300 variants. Notably, no airpower has been used by Russia in this war, and Ukraine’s air defenses remain a real problem, even for the modernized Russian air force. The report states that the bulk of casualties during separatist offenses are caused by long-range artillery, while recommending that the most important asset the United States can provide is Javelin “light anti-tank missiles.” These could make a real difference against Russian tanks, though there are visibly relatively few of them in operation in Ukraine. Outside of the fact that the Javelin is an extraordinarily expensive missile, at $250,000 per unit, and far from light (50lb), the problem with this logic is that Russia’s army will adapt instead of suffer needless casualties. It may force the Russian army to rely on heavier standoff weapons that would prove catastrophic for Ukraine. When anti-tank weapons proved a problem for Russian armor in Chechnya, they chose to level Grozny with artillery, for example. Russia’s army today is not the incompetent, underfunded force many remember. Crimea demonstrated that this is a capable army, able to conduct sophisticated operations, and unlikely to be stumped or defeated by the introduction of one weapon system or another.
该文作者们还主张提供战略防空单位，尽管乌克兰军队少数依然有效的领域之一正是在防空，从机动黄蜂和山毛榉系统到用于战略防空的S200、S300衍生系统。值得注意的是，俄国在这场战争中并没有使用空中力量。即使对于经过现代化的俄罗斯空军而言乌军防空系统仍然是一个现实的威胁。报告指出，分裂分子进攻中乌军大部分人员伤亡是通过远程火炮造成的，同时建议美国能提供的最重要的资产是标枪“轻型”反坦克导弹。这倒是可以给俄国坦克带来一个真正的教训，然而我们在乌克兰看不到多少俄国坦克。标枪是一种非常昂贵的导弹——每枚二十五万美元——而且并不轻（五十磅，约23公斤）。这些事实且置不提，这一逻辑的问题是，俄国军队能够适应这些新式武器，而不会遭受不必要的伤亡。它还可能会迫使俄罗斯军队转而依靠较为重型的防区外武器，这将是乌军的灾难。例如，当车臣战争中的反坦克武器给俄国装甲部队出了难题的时候，他们选择了用炮兵把格罗兹尼炸平。今天的俄军不是许多人记忆中那支无能又缺钱的队伍了。吞并克里米亚证明这是一支能打仗的军队，能够执行复杂军事行动，不大可能被一两件新式武器难倒或者打败。
The report makes little mention of the fact that light counter-battery radars had already been sent by the United States last fall, that Russia had matched these with its own, completely nullifying any advantage they might offer, or that mobile MLRS and artillery are unlikely to fall victim to counter-battery fire in the first place. The real problem is that many of Ukraine’s munitions are long past their service lives, the United States has no replacements for them or a quick fix for the lack of training and experience amongst Ukraine’s soldiers. The administration was right in arguing that any weapon we provide will be matched by Russia, escalating the conflict with no advantage gained for Ukraine.
该报告很少提及这一事实，即美国去年秋天已经送了轻型反炮兵雷达，然后俄国就部署了他们的同等系统完全中和了美国援助带来的任何优势，也没提到自行多管火箭炮和自行身管火炮本来就不大可能被反炮兵火力压制这一事实。真正的问题是，许多乌克兰军火早已过了使用寿命，美国既没有办法提供代用弹药，也没有办法迅速弥补乌军士兵所缺乏的训练和经验。奥巴马政府认为不管我们提供任何武器俄罗斯都会跟进，结果只会升级冲突而不会让乌克兰获得优势。这一观点是有道理的。
In the same vein, the authors keenly argue for the provision of armored Humvees. A piece of equipment not only long derided by U.S. troops and due for replacement, but also an unnecessary recommendation in light of Ukraine’s advanced defense industry. Ukraine is highly capable and proficient at producing indigenous lightly armored vehicles and heavy tanks. This is actually Ukraine’s defense industry’s area of expertise, and why the country has been successful as an arms exporter. In fact, its assembly plants have come up with a number of new designs already going into production, while the country still has vast stores of Soviet armor that can be refurbished and are being actively placed into action.
从同一思路出发，作者“敏锐地”主张提供装甲悍马：一种不单长期受到美国部队嘲笑而且早该换装，而且考虑到乌克兰先进的国防工业也是完全没有必要提供的装备。乌克兰相当能够生产轻装甲车和重型坦克，而且造了不少。这实际上是乌克兰国防工业的有专长的领域，并且是该国作为一个成功武器出口国的优势项目。事实上，该国坦克厂已经研制过几种早已投产的新型车辆，同时还存有大量可以翻新后服役的苏制装甲车辆。
Provision of defensive weapons fails to address Ukraine’s poor tactics on the ground and use of existing weapons, which have included ruinous armored counterattacks, having cost its forces countless T64BV tanks and mechanized equipment and failure to retreat that leaves soldiers to be encircled by separatists. Similarly, radio and secure communications are important, but not an answer to the completely uncoordinated attacks being launched by Ukraine’s army and its volunteers. They are unable to communicate not for shortage of radios, but due to a lack of unity in the war effort, and complete fragmentation of the forces involved.
提供防御性武器并不能解决前线乌军糟糕的战术和对现有的武器的拙劣运用：他们灾难性的装甲反击已经损失了无数的T64BV坦克和机械化装备，而失败的撤退只是留下己方士兵给分裂分子包围。同样，尽管无线和保密通信装备具有重要意义，它们也不能解决乌军和志愿营发起的完全无协调的进攻。他们无法相互沟通不是因为缺乏无线电设备，而是由于缺乏统一指挥，以及所投入的部队完全没有统一组织。
Finally, UAVs, some of which have already been provided by Germany, will not prove effective, either. The authors of the report recommend the provision of medium-altitude UAVs, after stating that Russian armed forces are operating advanced air defenses throughout eastern Ukraine. In truth, there is video evidence of Russian air defenses including the TorM2, the Pantsir-S1 and the now-infamous BUK that shot down MH17. Medium-altitude drones cannot fly in this kind of air-defense environment. Stating that Russia has air superiority contradicts the recommendation to send such drones, which require the operator to have air superiority.

最后，无人机——德国已经提供了一些——也不会有用。该报告的作者建议提供中空无人机，在自己指出俄国军队在整个乌克兰东部部署了先进防空系统之后。实际上，录像证据表明俄国已经部署的防空系统有道尔M2，铠甲-S1，以及现在因为击落MH17而臭名昭著的山毛榉。中空无人机无法在这种防空环境中飞行。指出俄罗斯占有空中优势与提供无人机的建议自相矛盾，后者需要使用者占有空中优势。
Again, the point of these criticisms is not that doing nothing to help Ukraine is better than doing something, although the specific recommendations are unlikely to achieve their intended effects. It is that the thrust of these policies is to drag the United States into a proxy conflict with Russia, in an attempt to raise costs for Vladimir Putin, which will be fought out by Ukrainian soldiers and paid for most likely with Ukrainian lives. In reality, nothing short of a difficult political compromise is possible to end this conflict. Kyiv will indeed have to make sacrifices as a result of Russian aggression, it has lost territory, and Moscow is clearly willing to stake everything in this conflict. More than likely the key battles in this war have already been fought, or are being fought right now, and they have proved to be defeats for Ukraine. Javelin anti-tank launchers will not prove to be a silver bullet, but rather an additional escalation, especially when Russia’s military calculates it could destroy Ukraine’s armed forces in a matter of days at will.
让我复述一遍，提出这些批评的目的不是说什么都不做比做些事更好，虽然报告提出的那些具体建议不大可能实现其预期的效果。提出这些批评的目的是报告中这些政策建议的主旨是把美国拖入与俄罗斯的代理人冲突，从而试图提高弗拉基米尔·普京付出的代价，而这一代理人冲突将由乌克兰士兵来打，这些代价最有可能由乌克兰人的生命来支付。在现实中，除非作出困难的政治妥协没有什么可能结束这场冲突。基辅因为俄罗斯的侵略确实将不得不作出牺牲——它已经失去了领土，而莫斯科显然愿意在这场冲突中赌一把大的。这场战争中的关键战斗很有可能是乌克兰已经输掉或者现在正在输掉的那些败仗。标枪反坦克发射器不会成为反败为胜的银弹，而是一个多余的挑衅，尤其是当俄国军队算出它随时可以在数天内毁灭乌克兰武装力量的时候。
In truth, the reason for the current winter offensive that was launched on January 13th is often misunderstood. It is widely recognized in Moscow that signing the Minsk ceasefire was a wholly unforced strategic mistake, as it achieved none of its stated political objectives, while making Russia a party to the conflict with obligations that could subsequently be pointed to by the West. Minsk remains a dead ceasefire because of a fundamental disagreement over the sequencing of how the deal should be implemented, not because Moscow could think of nothing better than to launch a ground offensive in January, the worst month for such operations. Russian leaders will not withdraw their forces, or restore control of the border, until they first see that Kyiv is willing to give political status and recognition to the separatists.
真相是当前这场冬季攻势在1月13日打响的原因经常受到误解。在莫斯科，人们普遍认识到签署明斯克停火协议完全是一个非受迫性战略失误，因为它没有达到它宣称要达成的任何一个政治目标，同时将俄罗斯列为冲突一方，这使得她有可能之后被西方要求承担她所负有的条约义务。明斯克成了一个无人遵守的停火协议，这是因为关于各方关于他们达成的交易应如何实现的顺序存在根本分歧，而不是因为莫斯科没事闲的非得在一月——一年中发动进攻最糟的一个月——发动地面进攻。俄国领导人不会撤出部队，或者交还边境控制，除非他们先看到基辅给予分裂分子政治地位和承认。
Ukrainian leaders naturally have no desire to grant true political recognition or autonomy to the separatists, and Russia has no interest in abandoning them to be completely crushed by political, economic and military pressure from Ukraine. Hence, Moscow and Kyiv did not fulfill their respective obligations under this agreement, or withdraw troops according to the secret protocol signed on September 19. That protocol stipulated a line of control that neither side honored. The separatists desire more territory to make their enclaves viable, while Ukraine’s leaders didn’t want to deal with the domestic political calamity that would result from admitting defeat or giving up territory for peace. In Kyiv, the leadership is divided, mindful of public sentiment and afraid that if they cut a deal with Moscow, a third Maidan could ensue. Ukraine’s president, Petro Poroshenko, recognizes that he needs to compromise with Russia, but he also needs to be visibly pressed into this by the West, due to the strength of other sentiments in Ukraine and his rivals. Sending arms undermines his position, and instead reinforces those who unrealistically wish to keep fighting.
乌克兰领导人当然无意给予分裂分子真正的政治承认和自主权，俄国也没有兴趣抛弃分裂分子让他们被乌克兰的政治、经济和军事压力彻底压垮。因此，莫斯科和基辅没有履行各自协议规定的义务，也没有按照9月19日签署的秘密协议收兵。这一协议中规定了一条任何一方都不打算尊重的控制线。分裂主义分子希望占据更多的领土从而使他们的独立王国有条件自立，而乌克兰领导人不希望处理将导致承认失败或放弃领土换和平的国内政治灾难。基辅领导层意见不一，受到民意挟制而变得瞻前顾后，害怕万一他们与莫斯科达成协议之后带来第三场迈丹运动。乌克兰总统波罗申科认识到他需要与俄国妥协，但由于乌克兰民意和他的对手的威胁他需要在公开场合显得像是被西方胁迫才与俄国妥协。送给乌克兰武器会破坏他的这一立场，而鼓舞那些不切实际的希望继续打仗的家伙们。
The reason for the resumption of the current war is that Russia’s leadership has wagered a colossal amount of political capital on its invasion of Ukraine. It is perhaps a matter of life and death for the current political system, and a core interest of Russia that it is unlikely to give up on, no matter the amount of Western political pressure or weapons sent. This is especially so given the casualties will be almost entirely Ukrainian on both sides. After Minsk, the West keenly levied economic and diplomatic pressure for Russia to implement provisions of the ceasefire agreement, while Kyiv had to do essentially nothing except hold the existing line of control. This presented Moscow with either policy capitulation, or continued suffering under the sanctions regime. Either way, the West had time to wait, and Russia did not. For the West, politically it was brilliant, diplomatically it was brilliant, but militarily it was dangerous. Russia has undertaken its only viable option, to launch another offensive, defeat Ukraine and erase the Minsk agreement by forcing Kyiv to sign a new one.
究其原因，当前的战事重启是因为俄国领导层已经在入侵乌克兰一事上押下了巨额政治资本。这也许是俄国现行政治制度的生死抉择，同时也是俄国不可能放弃的核心利益，无论西方送来多少政治压力或者武器装备都不能改变。考虑到伤亡将几乎完全由乌克兰双方来承担，俄国尤其不可能认输。明斯克协议之后，西方急着施加经济和外交压力要求俄方执行停火协议的规定，而基辅基本上除了守住现有控制线什么都不用做。这给莫斯科提出了一个要么投降，要么继续承受制裁的两难抉择。无论哪种选择，西方有时间等的起，而俄罗斯等不起。对于西方国家来说，明斯克协议在政治上是大丰收，在外交上是大丰收，但在军事上是危险的。结果俄罗斯采取了唯一可行的办法，即发动另一轮攻势，击败乌克兰，通过迫使基辅签署一份新的城下之盟来抹掉明斯克协议。
Undoubtedly, there are no easy solutions to the current conflict in Ukraine, only hard choices to be made. Sending weapons without an overall strategy is not a hard choice, but it is one that the United States has readily made before, often with adverse results. Providing anti-tank missiles to the Free Syrian Army did not change Syria’s or Russia’s calculus, but rather prolonged the demise of the FSA at the hands of Assad’s forces. Russia continues to arm Syria, the conflict continues to cost hundreds of thousands of civilian lives and the FSA is almost completely destroyed, but with no resolution in sight. Arming the militias of Libya and conducting air strikes on their behalf, with no strategy to create a Libyan nation or a Libyan army post-Qaddafi has resulted in one of the most disastrous American foreign policies in the region. Iraq is another example that providing weapons does not a fighting, or a successful, army make. Now ISIS forces drive around in American Humvees, while Shia militias have access to M1A1 Abrams tanks and MRAPs. It is important that the United States learn from these mistakes and seek a better outcome for Ukraine.
毫无疑问，乌克兰目前的冲突没有简单的解决方案，只能作出艰难的选择。没有一个总体规划的情况下送些武器不是一个艰难的选择，而是一个美国一直喜欢随便做出的选择，往往导致不良的结果。给叙利亚自由军提供反坦克导弹并没有打乱叙利亚和俄罗斯的算盘，只不过延后了自由军在阿萨德军队手中的灭亡。俄罗斯继续武装叙利亚，冲突继续让叙利亚平民付出数十万生命，自由军几乎完全被摧毁，叙利亚冲突还看不到头。没有一套在后卡扎菲时代创建一个利比亚国家或利比亚政府军计划的情况下武装利比亚的民兵并为他们发动空袭，已经成了该地区最具灾难性的美国外交政策之一。伊拉克是提供武器不能造就一支能打仗或成功的军队的另外一个例子。现在矽统军开着美国悍马横冲直撞，而什叶派民兵开上了M1A1艾布拉姆斯坦克和MRAP防雷车。从这些错误中吸取教训，为乌克兰寻求一个更好的结果对美国来说很重要。