基辅—日托米尔
经过在第聂伯河左岸凶险的战斗之后，苏军终于饮马第聂伯河，而瓦图京大将的乌克兰第一方面军也终于站到了基辅的对面，但夺取这个近在咫尺的目标却不容易。一方面，德军在大段撤退后终于撤到了第聂伯河防线。先不说防线是否坚固，至少第聂伯河这道天堑，苏军是不可能轻易跨过的。瓦图京虽然开辟了布克林桥头堡，但却始终冲不出去，即便实施了空降作战，也不过是送出更多的游击队。布克林桥头堡因为地理优势，所能容纳的部队远多于那些狭小的据点，但也正因如此，德军也将重兵布置于此用于封堵苏军。在布克林桥头堡当面，德军布置了第24、48装甲军，其中第48装甲军拥有第11、19装甲师、第20装甲掷弹兵师、第72、112、255步兵师，第24装甲军有第10装甲掷弹兵师、第34步兵师和帝国师。
在桥头堡打转了近一个月后，上至斯大林、朱可夫，下至瓦图京都认为在这里是冲不出去的，于是瓦图京吧近坦3集、步23军、突破炮7军等部队从登陆场抽出来，向柳捷日镇桥头堡转移。在天气封堵了德军空中侦察以及苏军自身纪律的保证下，整支大军成功转移而未被德军察觉。至11月1日，在这个长6公里宽3公里的桥头堡内，集结了一个集团军、一个坦克集团军、一个坦克军、一个骑兵军。每公里正面火炮迫击炮有近三四百门。而德军当面仅有8步兵师和一个警卫师，均不满员。苏德两军兵力比为步兵3：1、坦克9:1、火炮4.5:1。
11月3日，瓦图京以2500门火炮、迫击炮、火箭炮猛轰德军阵地，空军第二集团军也出动了1150架次支援方面军。在猛烈的炮火下，第38集团军迅速把德军68、88、208步兵师打飞，措手不及的霍特强令第20装甲掷弹兵师和第8装甲师驰援，随后又调第7装甲师增援。当日苏军突入纵深5-12公里。11月4日，瓦图京投入近坦3集，雷巴尔科的坦克开着大灯、拉着刺耳的警报声在凌晨夜战。德军第7装甲师以第25装甲团为核心的战斗群配合第20装甲掷弹兵师反击，但苏军迅速瓦解了德军的反击，强渡基辅以西5公里的伊尔平河，随后沿日托米尔-法斯托夫大道推进，将德军的反击集群切成两半，第20装机掷弹兵师的第90掷弹兵团被挤入基辅，集群其余大部则被向南挤压。随后近骑1军和两个集团军第二梯队也投入战场扫荡德军步兵，击毙试图恢复部队秩序的第88师师长。至11月5日凌晨，近坦3集切断基辅-日托米尔公路。11月5日夜8时整，苏军以第50、51步兵军、近坦5军一部强攻基辅城，德军守城的第7军迅速逃跑了，苏军在11月6日0时30分于基辅城头升起红旗，4时彻底肃清基辅城内德军的抵抗，克拉夫琴科也因解放基辅获苏联英雄称号。近坦3集则绕过基辅，猛攻法斯托夫。11月5日法斯托夫城内德军只有3个营，一个是休假伤愈归队人员、两个是警备营，还有一个第7装甲师师部，这些部队在整个坦克坦克集团军面前犹如螳臂当车。曼施坦因被战况搞得焦头烂额，不得已放弃了尼科波尔和基洛夫格勒的反击计划，尝试用从希特勒那里要来的第1、25装甲师、希特勒师以及第509重坦克营组织一次反击。曼施坦因同时还从自己麾下把24、48装甲军、第3、19装甲师、第10装甲步兵师、第198步兵师从第8集团军调至第四装甲集团军。为了组织反击，曼施坦因把第48装甲军的军部调到法斯托夫以南20公里的白采尔科维，但最关键的还是保住交通枢纽法斯托夫。瓦图京在11月6日下令近坦3集迅速夺取法斯托夫，于是近坦3集的独立坦克第91旅于11月6日黄昏抵达法斯托夫以东。并以一个营牵制，主力包抄的方式夜袭法斯托夫，在随后赶到的近坦6军支援下，至11月7日凌晨，苏军夺取法斯托夫，缴获64门高射炮、62个火车头、22列军列、90车皮锰矿、3000吨燃料、15万吨粮食。曼施坦因在得知法斯托夫失守后，命令第25装甲师和帝国师一个团夺回这个枢纽。尽管第25装甲师有90余辆坦克，但坦克团有两天路程才能赶到，于是第25装甲师遭遇了一场灾难，其第146装甲掷弹兵团撞上了近坦54旅，当场被击溃。11月9日，第25装甲师的装甲团终于赶到，会同提前下车的第509重坦克营第2、3连的25辆虎式坦克，再次反击，不过又撞上近坦3集的第二梯队机9军，战至11月10日，第25装甲师师长被打伤，虎式坦克也全损6辆。第7军只能逃向法斯托夫以南，第13军逃向日托米尔，第59军逃向科罗斯坚。在取得巨大战果后，苏军意识到曼施坦因即将反击，于是瓦图京在11月12日命令突击集团左翼组织防御，而右翼的第60、13集团军继续推进。不过在11月13日第38集团军和近骑1军仍夺取了日托米尔。德军有11个步兵师被打成团级，机动部队中的第7、8、25三个装甲师也被打的够呛。苏军方面只有6491人阵亡失踪，24078人受伤病，损失271辆坦克、104门火炮迫击炮、125架飞机。因遭受如此大败，希特勒一气之下把霍特给撸了，换上劳斯。
就在瓦图京组织防御之时，曼施坦因也开始组织他的反击了。因为与科涅夫的突击相比，瓦图京的惊人战果已经严重威胁了南方集团军群的左翼，尽管乌一没有力量实施对南方集团军群的大包围，但这颗楔子不能不拔，为此，曼施坦因集结了一支庞大的部队：原来被赶出日托米尔的第13军、反击主力，从布克林调来的第48装甲军、从基辅逃出来的第7军。其中第48装甲军的战力有6个装甲师、1个步兵师，因为第1、25装甲师和希特勒师是从后方来的，所以装备充足。
第48装甲军部分兵力：
第1装甲师：四号坦克95辆 黑豹坦克76辆 指挥坦克7辆 喷火坦克7辆
第25装甲师：四号坦克93辆 指挥坦克8辆 第509重坦克营的虎式25辆（不过只有14辆虎式能用）
帝国师：四号坦克22辆 三号坦克6辆 虎式坦克10辆
希特勒师：四号坦克95辆 黑豹坦克96辆 指挥坦克9辆 虎式坦克27辆
第7、8、19装甲师一共141辆坦克
其中因为法斯托夫失守和前期战斗的原因，德军装甲部队必须在更远的车站下车或被调至其他地方（509营就调了一个连去第9装甲团），所以可用数比师拥有数少很多，其中三个新来的师是路程原因，帝国师和第7装甲师之类的则是坦克等待修复的缘故。
不过在纸面数据壮观的情况下，巴尔克和梅林津开始飘了，计划从法斯托夫正面直插基辅，一举吃掉苏军第38集和近坦3集。不过劳斯在看到对面苏军如此多，手下装甲师也不是很“健康”，加上交通枢纽被端，一时半会调兵困难，就把这方案否了。于是梅林津在回忆录里大喷劳斯**（原文为“稳健”），表示劳斯不懂机动作战要有勇气、决心和魄力（劳斯表示这么少坦克打个屁的基辅，送死我不拦你，你别把我拖下水，我参加巴巴罗萨时你还不知在哪睡觉呢）。于是劳斯让第48装甲军改了方案，从日托米尔到布鲁西洛夫这一薄弱地域突击：其中第1装甲师和希特勒师在中路强攻，第68步兵师和第7装甲师在左翼，跟在突击箭头后包抄日托米尔，第25装甲师和帝国师在右翼应付近坦3集，等收复日托米尔和法斯托夫后再转向基辅。
11月15日，德军发起突击。第7装甲师当日就冲到了日托米尔东南的斯坦尼谢夫卡，次日有攻占日托米尔以东12公里的留克夫。11月17日希特勒师的第一装甲掷弹兵团就抵达了日托米尔-基辅铁路上的科切罗沃。第1装甲师也在11月17日转向与第7装甲师夹击日托米尔的苏军。第7装甲师的舒尔茨上校的第25坦克团17日夜开始进攻日托米尔。第8装甲师的第80装甲炮兵团也在突击炮支援下从南面进攻日托米尔，不过被苏军挡在城南3公里处。第8装甲师的另外两个“拉多维茨”战斗群（第8、28装甲掷弹兵团）、“米茨拉夫”战斗群（第10坦克团1营、第10装甲炮兵团1营、第8装甲侦察营）则在15日起就对日托米尔切尔尼亚科夫进行攻击了，第208步兵师则从西面对苏军施加压力。紧接着德军第13军的第208、340步兵师和第1、7、8装甲师、第68步兵师在11月18日完成了对日托米尔城中苏军第60集团军一部的包围。不过苏军却打的很顽强，据曼陀菲尔回忆11月18日一整天德军都打不进去，天黑前1个小时才找到一处薄弱的反坦克炮阵地。他组织了6辆坦克和100名掷弹兵的夜袭，从18日晚5点一路打到19日凌晨3点终于突破苏军防御，开始肃清城内苏军的抵抗。苏军因为担心全军覆没，于是立刻组织了突围，弃城而走。曼陀菲尔和舒尔茨也因重占日托米尔而被授勋，曼陀菲尔更是被冠以“日托米尔雄狮”的称号并被希特勒接见，从此进入希特勒的视野。
第48装甲军部分兵力：
第1装甲师：四号坦克95辆 黑豹坦克76辆 指挥坦克7辆 喷火坦克7辆
第25装甲师：四号坦克93辆 指挥坦克8辆 第509重坦克营的虎式25辆（不过只有14辆虎式能用）
帝国师：四号坦克22辆 三号坦克6辆 虎式坦克10辆
希特勒师：四号坦克95辆 黑豹坦克96辆 指挥坦克9辆 虎式坦克27辆
第7、8、19装甲师一共141辆坦克
其中因为法斯托夫失守和前期战斗的原因，德军装甲部队必须在更远的车站下车或被调至其他地方（509营就调了一个连去第9装甲团），所以可用数比师拥有数少很多，其中三个新来的师是路程原因，帝国师和第7装甲师之类的则是坦克等待修复的缘故。
不过在纸面数据壮观的情况下，巴尔克和梅林津开始飘了，计划从法斯托夫正面直插基辅，一举吃掉苏军第38集和近坦3集。不过劳斯在看到对面苏军如此多，手下装甲师也不是很“健康”，加上交通枢纽被端，一时半会调兵困难，就把这方案否了。于是梅林津在回忆录里大喷劳斯**（原文为“稳健”），表示劳斯不懂机动作战要有勇气、决心和魄力（劳斯表示这么少坦克打个屁的基辅，送死我不拦你，你别把我拖下水，我参加巴巴罗萨时你还不知在哪睡觉呢）。于是劳斯让第48装甲军改了方案，从日托米尔到布鲁西洛夫这一薄弱地域突击：其中第1装甲师和希特勒师在中路强攻，第68步兵师和第7装甲师在左翼，跟在突击箭头后包抄日托米尔，第25装甲师和帝国师在右翼应付近坦3集，等收复日托米尔和法斯托夫后再转向基辅。
11月15日，德军发起突击。第7装甲师当日就冲到了日托米尔东南的斯坦尼谢夫卡，次日有攻占日托米尔以东12公里的留克夫。11月17日希特勒师的第一装甲掷弹兵团就抵达了日托米尔-基辅铁路上的科切罗沃。第1装甲师也在11月17日转向与第7装甲师夹击日托米尔的苏军。第7装甲师的舒尔茨上校的第25坦克团17日夜开始进攻日托米尔。第8装甲师的第80装甲炮兵团也在突击炮支援下从南面进攻日托米尔，不过被苏军挡在城南3公里处。第8装甲师的另外两个“拉多维茨”战斗群（第8、28装甲掷弹兵团）、“米茨拉夫”战斗群（第10坦克团1营、第10装甲炮兵团1营、第8装甲侦察营）则在15日起就对日托米尔切尔尼亚科夫进行攻击了，第208步兵师则从西面对苏军施加压力。紧接着德军第13军的第208、340步兵师和第1、7、8装甲师、第68步兵师在11月18日完成了对日托米尔城中苏军第60集团军一部的包围。不过苏军却打的很顽强，据曼陀菲尔回忆11月18日一整天德军都打不进去，天黑前1个小时才找到一处薄弱的反坦克炮阵地。他组织了6辆坦克和100名掷弹兵的夜袭，从18日晚5点一路打到19日凌晨3点终于突破苏军防御，开始肃清城内苏军的抵抗。苏军因为担心全军覆没，于是立刻组织了突围，弃城而走。曼陀菲尔和舒尔茨也因重占日托米尔而被授勋，曼陀菲尔更是被冠以“日托米尔雄狮”的称号并被希特勒接见，从此进入希特勒的视野。
顺便讲一下，曼施坦因在回忆录里这一战动辄吃掉一个机械化军。我想说苏军在整个基辅攻防期间就三个坦克军一个机械化军一个骑兵军，其中大多在苏军进攻那一段被打剩半血。
不过这次胜利并未太大改善德军的态势，因为苏军仍有一个近坦3集威胁着德军的侧翼。时间也似乎回到了近半年前，在哈尔科夫，又是希特勒师和帝国师，又是这个近坦3集。近坦3集的部队在布鲁西洛夫集结，并出动了近坦5、8军和近骑1军对第48装甲军发起突击，不过没能撼动希特勒师的防线。巴尔克于是调整部署：将在18日于白采尔科维完成集结的第19装甲师分成两部分，一部是装甲师主力，从科尔宁自南向北进攻，一部是第74装甲掷弹兵团，沿东北方向朝大戈利亚推进并与第25装甲师会合。第25装甲师则分成三个战斗群，从法斯托夫以西进攻，并由帝国师来掩护。希特勒师在正西面担任主攻，第1装甲师沿日托米尔-基辅大道进攻并从西北包抄苏军，第7装甲师则在拉多梅什利城南面绕过该城，掩护其他装甲师左翼，第68步兵师则负责跟进，掩护整个装甲军的左翼。
11月20日第48装甲军战力：
11月20日凌晨1点，希特勒师以两个装甲掷弹兵团为主建立了两个战斗群（各配属一个坦克营和若干突击炮）。在虎式坦克和突击炮的引导下，希特勒师捅穿了苏军的防线，但好景不长，沿着沃多提-布鲁西洛夫公路推进的党卫军第2装甲掷弹兵团和第1坦克团第1营在凌晨3点于布鲁西洛夫西南3公里处被苏军顽强阻击。苦战之后也只缓慢推进了1.5公里就被苏军反坦克炮阵地彻底挡住。黎明时分，师长维施下令停止进攻。第1坦克团团长舍恩贝格也在20日中午被炸死，派普接任该团团长。
于是以第1装甲掷弹兵团为主的那个战斗群开始向西北迂回布鲁西洛夫，至22日终于杀到布鲁西洛夫西北的奥泽尔雅尼，但再次被苏军炮火挡住。于是该部又被调回布鲁西洛夫南面的索洛夫耶夫卡，支援正在这里进攻雅斯特雷本卡的第 2装甲掷弹兵团战斗群。两个战斗群花了足足一天时间，经过激烈的逐屋巷战才夺下这个布鲁西洛夫正东面的重镇。在希特勒师受挫的同时，德军的两翼却进展顺利，21日帝国师调到了拉多梅什利东南的施塔为谢，和第7装甲师一起组建了曼陀菲尔集群。该集群在23日至25日攻势凌厉，消灭众多苏军。第1装甲师沿日托米尔-基辅公路推进，切入布鲁西洛夫以东苏军的侧后，第19装甲师也在南面进展顺利（主要是因为苏军把主力都收缩到布鲁西洛夫和德军死战，所以其他地域空虚）。不过这两个装甲师并没有按巴尔克的要求夜袭包围苏军而是向平常一样在夜间修整。于是巴尔克强令两个师长继续进攻。而后梅林津在他的回忆录里开始吹水，称在21日晚就包围了苏军，打死苏军3000余人，缴获153辆坦克、70门火炮和250门反坦克炮（我只想说到德军开始反击时近坦3集就150辆坦克而已么，德军战技高超不击毁只俘虏），并说苏军只把骨干送出去而把大量士兵留在包围圈听天由命。不过事实是，第1装甲师到了23日才夺取布鲁西洛夫东北的十多公里的维索科耶并南下。当日夜第113装甲掷弹兵团经过突袭才攻克斯德威希，随后在向南追击时才与第19装甲师的侦察营相遇，勉强孤立了苏军。不过被孤立（此时尚不能称包围）的苏军数量相当多，因此这两个装甲师并没有办法堵死苏军，苏军随后迅速突围而走。而希特勒师则在23日攻克了布鲁西洛夫的杜布罗夫卡和拉萨洛夫卡，并在布鲁西洛夫以北和第一装甲师建立联系，并在24日肃清布鲁西洛夫。在清点时，德军得出的战果数字与梅林津基本相同，不过缴获变成了击毁+缴获。
11月20日第48装甲军战力：
11月20日凌晨1点，希特勒师以两个装甲掷弹兵团为主建立了两个战斗群（各配属一个坦克营和若干突击炮）。在虎式坦克和突击炮的引导下，希特勒师捅穿了苏军的防线，但好景不长，沿着沃多提-布鲁西洛夫公路推进的党卫军第2装甲掷弹兵团和第1坦克团第1营在凌晨3点于布鲁西洛夫西南3公里处被苏军顽强阻击。苦战之后也只缓慢推进了1.5公里就被苏军反坦克炮阵地彻底挡住。黎明时分，师长维施下令停止进攻。第1坦克团团长舍恩贝格也在20日中午被炸死，派普接任该团团长。
于是以第1装甲掷弹兵团为主的那个战斗群开始向西北迂回布鲁西洛夫，至22日终于杀到布鲁西洛夫西北的奥泽尔雅尼，但再次被苏军炮火挡住。于是该部又被调回布鲁西洛夫南面的索洛夫耶夫卡，支援正在这里进攻雅斯特雷本卡的第 2装甲掷弹兵团战斗群。两个战斗群花了足足一天时间，经过激烈的逐屋巷战才夺下这个布鲁西洛夫正东面的重镇。在希特勒师受挫的同时，德军的两翼却进展顺利，21日帝国师调到了拉多梅什利东南的施塔为谢，和第7装甲师一起组建了曼陀菲尔集群。该集群在23日至25日攻势凌厉，消灭众多苏军。第1装甲师沿日托米尔-基辅公路推进，切入布鲁西洛夫以东苏军的侧后，第19装甲师也在南面进展顺利（主要是因为苏军把主力都收缩到布鲁西洛夫和德军死战，所以其他地域空虚）。不过这两个装甲师并没有按巴尔克的要求夜袭包围苏军而是向平常一样在夜间修整。于是巴尔克强令两个师长继续进攻。而后梅林津在他的回忆录里开始吹水，称在21日晚就包围了苏军，打死苏军3000余人，缴获153辆坦克、70门火炮和250门反坦克炮（我只想说到德军开始反击时近坦3集就150辆坦克而已么，德军战技高超不击毁只俘虏），并说苏军只把骨干送出去而把大量士兵留在包围圈听天由命。不过事实是，第1装甲师到了23日才夺取布鲁西洛夫东北的十多公里的维索科耶并南下。当日夜第113装甲掷弹兵团经过突袭才攻克斯德威希，随后在向南追击时才与第19装甲师的侦察营相遇，勉强孤立了苏军。不过被孤立（此时尚不能称包围）的苏军数量相当多，因此这两个装甲师并没有办法堵死苏军，苏军随后迅速突围而走。而希特勒师则在23日攻克了布鲁西洛夫的杜布罗夫卡和拉萨洛夫卡，并在布鲁西洛夫以北和第一装甲师建立联系，并在24日肃清布鲁西洛夫。在清点时，德军得出的战果数字与梅林津基本相同，不过缴获变成了击毁+缴获。
前文讲过，瓦图京让他的左翼停了下来，但右翼仍在前进于是，苏军第60集团军继续向科罗斯坚推进。苏军在11月17日突入科罗斯坚，当时防守科罗斯坚的是德军第59步兵军（曼施坦因记成第49了），该军有第291步兵师和C军级集群两个师，但在第60集团军的凌厉攻势下还是迅速丢掉了科罗斯坚，尽管丢掉科罗斯坚时他们的态势像是在包围城内苏军，但他们同时也面临城外苏军的包抄。不过就在此时，德军在日托米尔和布鲁西洛夫方向发动的进攻牵制了苏军大量的兵力，所以，第59军得以乘着反击的东风在24日再攻科罗斯坚并于27日占领这个交通枢纽。
By early November, Hoth’s PzAOK 4 hadestablished a perimeter around the
Lyutezh bridgehead with four badly-depletedinfantry divisions (68, 82, 208, 327)
from the XIII Armeekorps and the88.Infanterie-Division from VII Armeekorps.193
Nearby, in reserve, Hoth had positionedOberst Gottfried Frölich’s 8.Panzer-
Division, which was a sad indication ofwhat poor condition the Heer’s once-
mighty Panzer-Divisionen had been reducedto by three years of near-continuous
combat. Although Frölich’s division had apaper-strength of 13,665 troops on 1
November, he only had a total of 610infantrymen in his four Panzergrenadier-
Bataillonen and the pioniers,reconnaissance troops and Panzerjägers added
another 545 troops. His sole tankbattalion, I./Pz.Rgt.10, had 14 tanks, including
seven Pz IV with long 187.5px. The 8.Panzer-Division’s Panzerjägerswere
equipped with seven 187.5px Pak, two 125px Pak 38 and five 92.5px Pak 36, while
divisional artillery support consisted ofthree self-propelled Wespe (262.5px),
two 250px cannons, two 375px howitzers and nine 262.5px howitzers. On the plus
side, Frölich still had 64 SPWs and 828trucks, so his remaining troops were
fairly mobile. Frölich deployed KampfgruppeNeise (all the Panzergrenadiers)
and Kampfgruppe von Mitzlaff (I./Pz.Rgt.10,reconnaissance and one artillery
battalion) as tactical reserves for theXIII Armeekorps.194
At 0800 hours on 3 November,General-leytenant Kirill S. Moskalenko’s 38th
Army began a massive 40-minute artillerypreparation against the German infantry
positions around the southern side of theLyutezh bridgehead. Vatutin had also
moved the 7th Artillery Corps within rangeof the bridgehead, as well as
numerous Katyusha rocket batteries. TheGerman front-line infantry in this sector
were not expecting a major enemy assaultand had not built deep fieldworks in the
marshy ground near Lyutezh; consequently,the Soviet artillery bombardment
wreaked havoc. At 0840 hours, six Sovietrifle divisions surged forward,
supported by tanks from the 5 GTC. Sappersproceeded in front to remove enemy
mines. Although dazed, the German infantryput up a tough fight and limited the
initial Soviet push to a 3km advance.195 Frölich’s 8.Panzer-Divisionwas slow to
react and then managed only a few localcounter-attacks. As the 38th Army
committed its second-echelon forces,including additional armour, the German 68.
and 82.Infanterie-Divisionen began tocollapse, yielding another 4km.In an
unusual move, Rybalko’s 3 GTA (6 GTC, 7GTC, 9 MC) entered the battle at dusk
and continued to advance forward during thenight. On the second day of the
offensive, drizzling rain deprived bothsides of air support but also helped to
conceal the fact that the Red Army hadcommitted three tank and one mechanized
corps to the breakout operation. Poundedrelentlessly, the German XIII
Armeekorps collapsed and the Soviet 51stRifle Corps reached the outskirts of
Kiev by the evening of 4 November. While 5GTC followed Moskalenko’s 38th
Army into the city, Rybalko’s 3 GTA swungto the southeast to cut the enemy road
and rail links into the city. In order toconduct continuous operations, Rybalko
ordered his tanks to drive through thenight with headlights on, which enabled 7
GTC to cut the main road into Kiev before8. Panzer-Division could block them.
By 5 November the 88.Infanterie-Divisionwas virtually obliterated and the
8.Panzer-Division had been shoved rudelyaside by Rybalko’s armoured mass.
Hoth quickly realized that defending Kievwas now a hopeless task and focused
instead upon saving the rail station atFastov, where the 25.Panzer-Division was
just arriving. He deployed the7.Panzer-Division to block the 6 GTC, but it
arrived too late and the Soviet tankersoccupied the station. During the early
morning hours of 6 November, a motorizedinfantry company fought its way to the
centre of Kiev and raised the Red flag.Once the Germans realized that Soviet
units were in the centre of the city theybrusquely retreated to the south. Vatutin’s
use of Rybalko’s 3 GTA to liberate Kievdemonstrated a vast advance in the Red
Army’s practice of mechanized warfare andvon Manstein was left chagrined at
his failure to anticipate enemy actions.The fall of Kiev was the culmination of the
Soviet Lower Dnepr offensive, which hadseen Hitler’s plan to transform the
Dnepr River into an impregnable bulwarkcompletely frustrated. In the process,
Heeresgruppe Süd had suffered cripplinglosses, amounting to about 170,000
personnel (including over 48,000 dead ormissing) and over 500 tanks.
Furthermore, only 44 per cent of Germantanks on the Eastern Front – about 600
vehicles – were still operational.196Nevertheless, this Soviet operational triumph
did not come cheap, costing the Red Army atleast 450,000 casualties and 1,800
tanks.
Lyutezh bridgehead with four badly-depletedinfantry divisions (68, 82, 208, 327)
from the XIII Armeekorps and the88.Infanterie-Division from VII Armeekorps.193
Nearby, in reserve, Hoth had positionedOberst Gottfried Frölich’s 8.Panzer-
Division, which was a sad indication ofwhat poor condition the Heer’s once-
mighty Panzer-Divisionen had been reducedto by three years of near-continuous
combat. Although Frölich’s division had apaper-strength of 13,665 troops on 1
November, he only had a total of 610infantrymen in his four Panzergrenadier-
Bataillonen and the pioniers,reconnaissance troops and Panzerjägers added
another 545 troops. His sole tankbattalion, I./Pz.Rgt.10, had 14 tanks, including
seven Pz IV with long 187.5px. The 8.Panzer-Division’s Panzerjägerswere
equipped with seven 187.5px Pak, two 125px Pak 38 and five 92.5px Pak 36, while
divisional artillery support consisted ofthree self-propelled Wespe (262.5px),
two 250px cannons, two 375px howitzers and nine 262.5px howitzers. On the plus
side, Frölich still had 64 SPWs and 828trucks, so his remaining troops were
fairly mobile. Frölich deployed KampfgruppeNeise (all the Panzergrenadiers)
and Kampfgruppe von Mitzlaff (I./Pz.Rgt.10,reconnaissance and one artillery
battalion) as tactical reserves for theXIII Armeekorps.194
At 0800 hours on 3 November,General-leytenant Kirill S. Moskalenko’s 38th
Army began a massive 40-minute artillerypreparation against the German infantry
positions around the southern side of theLyutezh bridgehead. Vatutin had also
moved the 7th Artillery Corps within rangeof the bridgehead, as well as
numerous Katyusha rocket batteries. TheGerman front-line infantry in this sector
were not expecting a major enemy assaultand had not built deep fieldworks in the
marshy ground near Lyutezh; consequently,the Soviet artillery bombardment
wreaked havoc. At 0840 hours, six Sovietrifle divisions surged forward,
supported by tanks from the 5 GTC. Sappersproceeded in front to remove enemy
mines. Although dazed, the German infantryput up a tough fight and limited the
initial Soviet push to a 3km advance.195 Frölich’s 8.Panzer-Divisionwas slow to
react and then managed only a few localcounter-attacks. As the 38th Army
committed its second-echelon forces,including additional armour, the German 68.
and 82.Infanterie-Divisionen began tocollapse, yielding another 4km.In an
unusual move, Rybalko’s 3 GTA (6 GTC, 7GTC, 9 MC) entered the battle at dusk
and continued to advance forward during thenight. On the second day of the
offensive, drizzling rain deprived bothsides of air support but also helped to
conceal the fact that the Red Army hadcommitted three tank and one mechanized
corps to the breakout operation. Poundedrelentlessly, the German XIII
Armeekorps collapsed and the Soviet 51stRifle Corps reached the outskirts of
Kiev by the evening of 4 November. While 5GTC followed Moskalenko’s 38th
Army into the city, Rybalko’s 3 GTA swungto the southeast to cut the enemy road
and rail links into the city. In order toconduct continuous operations, Rybalko
ordered his tanks to drive through thenight with headlights on, which enabled 7
GTC to cut the main road into Kiev before8. Panzer-Division could block them.
By 5 November the 88.Infanterie-Divisionwas virtually obliterated and the
8.Panzer-Division had been shoved rudelyaside by Rybalko’s armoured mass.
Hoth quickly realized that defending Kievwas now a hopeless task and focused
instead upon saving the rail station atFastov, where the 25.Panzer-Division was
just arriving. He deployed the7.Panzer-Division to block the 6 GTC, but it
arrived too late and the Soviet tankersoccupied the station. During the early
morning hours of 6 November, a motorizedinfantry company fought its way to the
centre of Kiev and raised the Red flag.Once the Germans realized that Soviet
units were in the centre of the city theybrusquely retreated to the south. Vatutin’s
use of Rybalko’s 3 GTA to liberate Kievdemonstrated a vast advance in the Red
Army’s practice of mechanized warfare andvon Manstein was left chagrined at
his failure to anticipate enemy actions.The fall of Kiev was the culmination of the
Soviet Lower Dnepr offensive, which hadseen Hitler’s plan to transform the
Dnepr River into an impregnable bulwarkcompletely frustrated. In the process,
Heeresgruppe Süd had suffered cripplinglosses, amounting to about 170,000
personnel (including over 48,000 dead ormissing) and over 500 tanks.
Furthermore, only 44 per cent of Germantanks on the Eastern Front – about 600
vehicles – were still operational.196Nevertheless, this Soviet operational triumph
did not come cheap, costing the Red Army atleast 450,000 casualties and 1,800
tanks.
German counter-attacks near Kiev, 7November-24
December 1943
Hitler was furious that Hoth had lost Kievand he decided to replace him with
General der Panzertruppe Erhard Raus. VonManstein was also rapidly falling out
of favour, but he argued with Hitler thatit might be possible to conduct another
‘BackhandBlow’ counter-offensive against Rybalko’s 3 GTA and retake Kiev. It
was true that strong armouredreinforcements were arriving on the Eastern Front,
including the refitted 1.Panzer-Divisionand the LSSAH (now redesignated as a
Panzer-Division), which were very powerfulformations, each equipped with one
battalion of Panthers and one of Pz IVs. Inaddition, the newly-formed 25.Panzer-
Division was arriving from Norway and thenew s.Pz. Abt.509 from Germany
with more Tigers. These formations were allat full-strength and totalled 558
tanks, including 172 Panthers and 72 Tigers.Von Manstein also received Das
Reich, which still had 33 tanks, includingfive Tigers. He decided to mass this
incoming armour at Bila Tserkva andBerdichev under the control of XXXXVIII
Panzerkorps and make a coordinated strikeagainst Rybalko’s left flank at Fastov.
Always eager to approve offensives thatmight restore the situation, Hitler quickly
agreed to von Manstein’s recommendations.On the other hand, Hitler had issued
Führer Directive 51 on the same day as thebeginning of the Soviet breakout from
the Lyutezh bridgehead; this edict shiftedpriority of replacements to the West in
anticipation of an Allied amphibiousinvasion of France in 1944, which meant
that von Manstein could not expectsignificant reinforcements beyond what was
already en route.197
Von Clausewitz, the Prussian militarywriter, spoke of ‘friction’ in war – an
often indiscernible sequence of smallevents and factors that can gradually
undermine an operational plan. It was thisfriction – some of which was self-
inflicted – which caused von Manstein’ssecond attempted ‘Backhand Blow’ to
fail. First, both Hitler and the OKHdisrupted planning by shuffling commanders
around, seemingly at random. General derPanzertruppen Heinrich Eberbach,
commander of the XXXXVIII Panzerkorps, wasreplaced at the last moment by
General der Panzertruppen Hermann Balck,who had been sent to command a
corps at Salerno for a month then returnedto the Eastern Front.* Second, Soviet
partisans disrupted German rail trafficwest of Fastov and many inbound units
were arriving piecemeal and often unloadedat different rail stations, which
seriously disrupted preparations to employthem in a coherent manner. Finally,
enemy actions did not stop and PzAOK 4’s left flank had virtually fallen apart,
allowing the Soviets to advance towardZhitomir and Korosten. Ideally, von
Manstein would have waited until all hisunits were fully assembled and
prepared, but Vatutin was not going to givehim that time. Now, von Manstein was
forced to conduct a major armouredcounter-attack in the manner that the Red
Army had employed in 1941 – with sloppystaff work, poor logistics and units
committed as they arrived. The decision tobegin a major counter-attack during a
rainy period when deep mud seriouslyhampered tactical mobility further
impaired German capabilities.
In order to prevent Ivanov’s 7 GTC fromover-running the German assembly
areas, Raus committed the Das Reich,Kampfgruppe von Wechmar from the
25.Panzer-Division and s.Pz.Abt.509 tolocal counter-attacks south of Fastov on
9–13 November. Although the Germans claimedto have knocked out over 30
Soviet tanks in several days of tankskirmishing, the results were disappointing. In
particular, s.Pz.Abt.509 lost seven Tigersdestroyed and only had 14 operational
by the time that von Manstein’scounter-offensive was supposed to begin.198 It
was also obvious during the lead-up to thecounter-offensive that the newly-
arrived 25.Panzer-Division was a ‘soft’unit that was not ready to be thrust into
heavy combat; most of its personnel hadbeen on occupation duty in Norway for
years and its original commander,Generalleutnant Adolf von Schell, had no
command experience and was in poor health.Guderian tried to stop him from
going East with the division but he wasoverruled by the OKH; within a week,
Schell was relieved of command. Indeed,Guderian tried to stop the entire
division from being sent East since hebelieved that it was not combat-ready. In
its first action, Kampfgruppe von Wechmarwas sent to retake Fastov but panicked
when attacked by T-34s and retreated indisorder, suffering heavy losses of men
and vehicles.199
An even worse development than Rybalko’sthreat to the German assembly
areas south of Fastov was that Vatutinachieved a major operational breakthrough
west of Kiev and he sent General-leytenantViktor K. Baranov’s 1st Guards
Cavalry Corps (1 GCC) as a mobile groupeast toward the main German supply
base at Zhitomir, followed byGeneral-leytenant Kirill S. Moskalenko’s 38th
Army. Moskalenko’s army included the 7thGuards Heavy Tank Regiment
equipped with 21 of the new KV-85 heavytanks, which were intended as a stop-
gap until the new IS-2 and T-34/85 tanksarrived in early 1944. Frölich’s
8.Panzer-Division tried to block theZhitomir-Kiev road, but they were forced to
retreat by Baranov’s cavalry, whose ownarmoured support greatly exceeded this
threadbare Panzer-Division.* On 13November, the 1 GCC and 23rd Rifle Corps
captured Zhitomir.200 The loss of Zhitomirwas near-catastrophic since it was a
vital rail junction and supply base;without it Heeresgruppe Süd’s line of
communications were reduced to single trackrail lines. Von Manstein and Raus
were forced to reorient theircounter-offensive from a classic pincer attack into
more of a head-on engagement to retake bothZhitomir and Fastov. Deploying the
LSSAH as a covering force near Brusilov toprevent interference from Rybalko’s
3 GTA, Raus sent the 1. and7.Panzer-Divisionen to converge upon the 1 GCC at
Zhitomir. Rybalko’s tanks sparred withLSSAH and repulsed an attempt to capture
Brusilov, but otherwise failed to supportthe isolated 1 GCC, so tanks and
Panzergrenadiers stormed Zhitomir on 20November.
December 1943
Hitler was furious that Hoth had lost Kievand he decided to replace him with
General der Panzertruppe Erhard Raus. VonManstein was also rapidly falling out
of favour, but he argued with Hitler thatit might be possible to conduct another
‘BackhandBlow’ counter-offensive against Rybalko’s 3 GTA and retake Kiev. It
was true that strong armouredreinforcements were arriving on the Eastern Front,
including the refitted 1.Panzer-Divisionand the LSSAH (now redesignated as a
Panzer-Division), which were very powerfulformations, each equipped with one
battalion of Panthers and one of Pz IVs. Inaddition, the newly-formed 25.Panzer-
Division was arriving from Norway and thenew s.Pz. Abt.509 from Germany
with more Tigers. These formations were allat full-strength and totalled 558
tanks, including 172 Panthers and 72 Tigers.Von Manstein also received Das
Reich, which still had 33 tanks, includingfive Tigers. He decided to mass this
incoming armour at Bila Tserkva andBerdichev under the control of XXXXVIII
Panzerkorps and make a coordinated strikeagainst Rybalko’s left flank at Fastov.
Always eager to approve offensives thatmight restore the situation, Hitler quickly
agreed to von Manstein’s recommendations.On the other hand, Hitler had issued
Führer Directive 51 on the same day as thebeginning of the Soviet breakout from
the Lyutezh bridgehead; this edict shiftedpriority of replacements to the West in
anticipation of an Allied amphibiousinvasion of France in 1944, which meant
that von Manstein could not expectsignificant reinforcements beyond what was
already en route.197
Von Clausewitz, the Prussian militarywriter, spoke of ‘friction’ in war – an
often indiscernible sequence of smallevents and factors that can gradually
undermine an operational plan. It was thisfriction – some of which was self-
inflicted – which caused von Manstein’ssecond attempted ‘Backhand Blow’ to
fail. First, both Hitler and the OKHdisrupted planning by shuffling commanders
around, seemingly at random. General derPanzertruppen Heinrich Eberbach,
commander of the XXXXVIII Panzerkorps, wasreplaced at the last moment by
General der Panzertruppen Hermann Balck,who had been sent to command a
corps at Salerno for a month then returnedto the Eastern Front.* Second, Soviet
partisans disrupted German rail trafficwest of Fastov and many inbound units
were arriving piecemeal and often unloadedat different rail stations, which
seriously disrupted preparations to employthem in a coherent manner. Finally,
enemy actions did not stop and PzAOK 4’s left flank had virtually fallen apart,
allowing the Soviets to advance towardZhitomir and Korosten. Ideally, von
Manstein would have waited until all hisunits were fully assembled and
prepared, but Vatutin was not going to givehim that time. Now, von Manstein was
forced to conduct a major armouredcounter-attack in the manner that the Red
Army had employed in 1941 – with sloppystaff work, poor logistics and units
committed as they arrived. The decision tobegin a major counter-attack during a
rainy period when deep mud seriouslyhampered tactical mobility further
impaired German capabilities.
In order to prevent Ivanov’s 7 GTC fromover-running the German assembly
areas, Raus committed the Das Reich,Kampfgruppe von Wechmar from the
25.Panzer-Division and s.Pz.Abt.509 tolocal counter-attacks south of Fastov on
9–13 November. Although the Germans claimedto have knocked out over 30
Soviet tanks in several days of tankskirmishing, the results were disappointing. In
particular, s.Pz.Abt.509 lost seven Tigersdestroyed and only had 14 operational
by the time that von Manstein’scounter-offensive was supposed to begin.198 It
was also obvious during the lead-up to thecounter-offensive that the newly-
arrived 25.Panzer-Division was a ‘soft’unit that was not ready to be thrust into
heavy combat; most of its personnel hadbeen on occupation duty in Norway for
years and its original commander,Generalleutnant Adolf von Schell, had no
command experience and was in poor health.Guderian tried to stop him from
going East with the division but he wasoverruled by the OKH; within a week,
Schell was relieved of command. Indeed,Guderian tried to stop the entire
division from being sent East since hebelieved that it was not combat-ready. In
its first action, Kampfgruppe von Wechmarwas sent to retake Fastov but panicked
when attacked by T-34s and retreated indisorder, suffering heavy losses of men
and vehicles.199
An even worse development than Rybalko’sthreat to the German assembly
areas south of Fastov was that Vatutinachieved a major operational breakthrough
west of Kiev and he sent General-leytenantViktor K. Baranov’s 1st Guards
Cavalry Corps (1 GCC) as a mobile groupeast toward the main German supply
base at Zhitomir, followed byGeneral-leytenant Kirill S. Moskalenko’s 38th
Army. Moskalenko’s army included the 7thGuards Heavy Tank Regiment
equipped with 21 of the new KV-85 heavytanks, which were intended as a stop-
gap until the new IS-2 and T-34/85 tanksarrived in early 1944. Frölich’s
8.Panzer-Division tried to block theZhitomir-Kiev road, but they were forced to
retreat by Baranov’s cavalry, whose ownarmoured support greatly exceeded this
threadbare Panzer-Division.* On 13November, the 1 GCC and 23rd Rifle Corps
captured Zhitomir.200 The loss of Zhitomirwas near-catastrophic since it was a
vital rail junction and supply base;without it Heeresgruppe Süd’s line of
communications were reduced to single trackrail lines. Von Manstein and Raus
were forced to reorient theircounter-offensive from a classic pincer attack into
more of a head-on engagement to retake bothZhitomir and Fastov. Deploying the
LSSAH as a covering force near Brusilov toprevent interference from Rybalko’s
3 GTA, Raus sent the 1. and7.Panzer-Divisionen to converge upon the 1 GCC at
Zhitomir. Rybalko’s tanks sparred withLSSAH and repulsed an attempt to capture
Brusilov, but otherwise failed to supportthe isolated 1 GCC, so tanks and
Panzergrenadiers stormed Zhitomir on 20November.
The morning of 24 December was overcast andit was raining. At 0600 hours,
Moskalenko’s 38th Army began a 60-minuteartillery preparation against the
XXXXII Armeekorps, then attacked with tenrifle divisions supported by 200
tanks. The main Soviet effort struck theboundary between the 19. and 25.Panzer-
Divisionen and quickly gained ground.Generalmajor Hans Källner’s 19.Panzer-
Division had 16 operational tanks and eightself-propelled Panzerjagers, but only
a few hundred Panzergrenadiers, so it wasforced to fight a delaying action. The
25.Panzer-Division was considerablystronger, with 51 tanks and seven StuG IIIs,
but its left flank was soon exposed andKällner fell back.205 The same thing
happened to the 8.Panzer-Division, as itsright flank was exposed. By nightfall,
the centre of XXXXII Armeekorps wascollapsing under the hammer-blows of
infantry and tanks and its threePanzer-Divisionen had to keep fighting their way
out of encirclements. Once it was clearthat Moskalenko had achieved a tactical
breakthrough, Vatutin committed bothKatukov’s 1 TA and Rybalko’s 3 GTA to
exploit – the first time that two tankarmies had attacked simultaneously side-by-
side. Caught by surprise, Raus tried toadjust his forces, but the Soviet armour
moved much too quickly. By the third day ofthe Soviet offensive the XXXXII
Armeekorps was falling apart and Raus hadnothing to plug the gap. Raus focused
on massing 1.Panzer-Division and LSSAHaround Zhitomir, but Vatutin reoriented
his tanks southward instead of westward,flowing around German strongpoints.
By 30 December, the XXXXVIII Panzerkorpswas nearly encircled in Zhitomir
and PzAOK 4 had broken into three pieces,with large gaps in between. Raus
abandoned both Korosten and Zhitomir andtried to mass his remaining forces
around Berdichev. As the year ended,Vatutin had PzaOK 4 on the run and the
German front was in complete chaos.
German accounts of this period of the wartend to emphasize tactical victories,
where small numbers of German tanks knockedout much larger number of Soviet
tanks. While there is some truth in theseaccounts, they are generally silent about
German losses. These types of accounts alsotend to miss the main point, that
German armour was fighting delayingactions, not successful defensive
operations, while the much-maligned T-34swere generally accomplishing their
operational objectives. The fact is that bylate 1943 the Panzer-Divisionen could
no longer stop the Soviet ‘steamroller’,only delay it and increase the price of
victories. Each retreat cost the Germanslogistic resources that further degraded
their ability to maintain combat-effectivePanzer-Divisionen in the field and the
breaking point was fast approaching. It isalso important to note that the Panzer-
Divisionen lost their freedom of manoeuvrein late 1943, due to being
increasingly tied to the defence ofcritical sectors. Von Manstein no longer had a
masse de manoeuvre.
There is no doubt that victory did not comecheaply for Vatutin’s and Konev’s
fronts, which had suffered personnelcasualties that exceeded 1 million (including
290,000 dead or missing) duringJuly–December 1943, but they received a
similar number of replacements. In the sameperiod, the Red Army as a whole lost
about 12,000 tanks, but 10,162 new tankswere built and about 7,000 damaged
tanks repaired, which enabled the Sovietsto maintain a 3–1 or better armoured
numerical superiority over the Germans.206 In contrast, the Germans lost a total of
about 2,800 tanks and 850 assault guns inthe East during July–December 1943,
against 1,954 tanks and 1,328 assault gunsreceived as replacements or
reinforcements.207 Indeed, only 60 per centof German AFV production in this
period went to the Eastern Front, the restgoing to build up armoured units for the
defence of Western Europe. Due to the lossof repair facilities in Dnepropetrovsk
and Kiev, German support capabilities wereseverely disrupted: only half of the
2,053 German tanks on the Eastern Front on31 December 1943 were
operational.208 The personnel situation waseven worse for von Manstein, with
Heeresgruppe Süd having suffered over372,000 casualties (including 102,000
dead or missing) in the last half of 1943,but receiving fewer than 200,000
replacements.
Beyond the crushing quantitative imbalance,the failure of the much-anticipated
Panther tank to deliver a qualitativesolution to the Red Army’s numerical
advantage was a severe disappointment forthe Panzer-Divisionen. Although the
Panther’s long 187.5px KwK 42 gun had proven itself, the new tank’smechanical
unreliability prevented it from making morethan a local impression; at the critical
moment in December 1943, only 28 of PzAOK 4’s 139 Panthers were
operational.209
Moskalenko’s 38th Army began a 60-minuteartillery preparation against the
XXXXII Armeekorps, then attacked with tenrifle divisions supported by 200
tanks. The main Soviet effort struck theboundary between the 19. and 25.Panzer-
Divisionen and quickly gained ground.Generalmajor Hans Källner’s 19.Panzer-
Division had 16 operational tanks and eightself-propelled Panzerjagers, but only
a few hundred Panzergrenadiers, so it wasforced to fight a delaying action. The
25.Panzer-Division was considerablystronger, with 51 tanks and seven StuG IIIs,
but its left flank was soon exposed andKällner fell back.205 The same thing
happened to the 8.Panzer-Division, as itsright flank was exposed. By nightfall,
the centre of XXXXII Armeekorps wascollapsing under the hammer-blows of
infantry and tanks and its threePanzer-Divisionen had to keep fighting their way
out of encirclements. Once it was clearthat Moskalenko had achieved a tactical
breakthrough, Vatutin committed bothKatukov’s 1 TA and Rybalko’s 3 GTA to
exploit – the first time that two tankarmies had attacked simultaneously side-by-
side. Caught by surprise, Raus tried toadjust his forces, but the Soviet armour
moved much too quickly. By the third day ofthe Soviet offensive the XXXXII
Armeekorps was falling apart and Raus hadnothing to plug the gap. Raus focused
on massing 1.Panzer-Division and LSSAHaround Zhitomir, but Vatutin reoriented
his tanks southward instead of westward,flowing around German strongpoints.
By 30 December, the XXXXVIII Panzerkorpswas nearly encircled in Zhitomir
and PzAOK 4 had broken into three pieces,with large gaps in between. Raus
abandoned both Korosten and Zhitomir andtried to mass his remaining forces
around Berdichev. As the year ended,Vatutin had PzaOK 4 on the run and the
German front was in complete chaos.
German accounts of this period of the wartend to emphasize tactical victories,
where small numbers of German tanks knockedout much larger number of Soviet
tanks. While there is some truth in theseaccounts, they are generally silent about
German losses. These types of accounts alsotend to miss the main point, that
German armour was fighting delayingactions, not successful defensive
operations, while the much-maligned T-34swere generally accomplishing their
operational objectives. The fact is that bylate 1943 the Panzer-Divisionen could
no longer stop the Soviet ‘steamroller’,only delay it and increase the price of
victories. Each retreat cost the Germanslogistic resources that further degraded
their ability to maintain combat-effectivePanzer-Divisionen in the field and the
breaking point was fast approaching. It isalso important to note that the Panzer-
Divisionen lost their freedom of manoeuvrein late 1943, due to being
increasingly tied to the defence ofcritical sectors. Von Manstein no longer had a
masse de manoeuvre.
There is no doubt that victory did not comecheaply for Vatutin’s and Konev’s
fronts, which had suffered personnelcasualties that exceeded 1 million (including
290,000 dead or missing) duringJuly–December 1943, but they received a
similar number of replacements. In the sameperiod, the Red Army as a whole lost
about 12,000 tanks, but 10,162 new tankswere built and about 7,000 damaged
tanks repaired, which enabled the Sovietsto maintain a 3–1 or better armoured
numerical superiority over the Germans.206 In contrast, the Germans lost a total of
about 2,800 tanks and 850 assault guns inthe East during July–December 1943,
against 1,954 tanks and 1,328 assault gunsreceived as replacements or
reinforcements.207 Indeed, only 60 per centof German AFV production in this
period went to the Eastern Front, the restgoing to build up armoured units for the
defence of Western Europe. Due to the lossof repair facilities in Dnepropetrovsk
and Kiev, German support capabilities wereseverely disrupted: only half of the
2,053 German tanks on the Eastern Front on31 December 1943 were
operational.208 The personnel situation waseven worse for von Manstein, with
Heeresgruppe Süd having suffered over372,000 casualties (including 102,000
dead or missing) in the last half of 1943,but receiving fewer than 200,000
replacements.
Beyond the crushing quantitative imbalance,the failure of the much-anticipated
Panther tank to deliver a qualitativesolution to the Red Army’s numerical
advantage was a severe disappointment forthe Panzer-Divisionen. Although the
Panther’s long 187.5px KwK 42 gun had proven itself, the new tank’smechanical
unreliability prevented it from making morethan a local impression; at the critical
moment in December 1943, only 28 of PzAOK 4’s 139 Panthers were
operational.209
布鲁西洛夫会战后，德军将苏军逼向捷捷列夫河，但因为路况问题要停下来修整。而苏军一边，瓦图京在最初的慌张之后，在罗科索夫斯基的安抚与斯大林的严令下，也开始着手组织反击。苏军的反击意图被德第8航空军侦查到，于是劳斯和曼施坦因决定先发制人，再发动一次攻击打乱苏军的准备工作并改善德军的态势。11月30日，劳斯要求巴尔克做好反击准备，随后把第1、7装甲师和希特勒师从原位置上撤了下来，重新在集团军防线中段的切尔尼亚科夫西北集结。巴尔克计划以第68步兵师、从日托米尔出发，打击苏军右翼，该师左翼的希特勒师从切尔尼亚科夫西北进攻德军第13军面对的苏军，第1装甲师则在希特勒师西北面的费德罗夫卡，负责包抄苏军，向拉多梅什利以北和东北方向推进，第7装甲师部署在第1装甲师西北的沃洛达尔斯克，穿越日托米尔—克洛斯滕公路继续向东北推进，直至伊尔沙河河岸的马林。
劳斯一面派工兵修复进攻路上的道路与桥梁，一面命令亚历山大·格申的第213保安师肃清附近森林中活动猖獗的苏联游击队。随后他命令三个装甲师在白天沿着通向日托米尔的主要公路大摇大摆的行进，以图迷惑苏军。同时，他还给在日托米尔-拉多梅什利地域进行防御的豪费将军第13军调去了集团军所有的炮兵营、一个火箭发射旅、一列装甲列车。劳斯做的所有准备，为的就是让苏军相信德军将在第4装甲集团军右翼发动进攻，12月6日拂晓第13军开始强而有力的炮击，汉斯·皮肯博尔克少将的第208步兵师开始佯攻，苏军注意力完全被吸引到这一区域，忽视了他们左翼当面集结的强大的德军装甲部队，苏军出动所有预备队和重武器去反击德军右翼的两个军。而为了保证第7装甲师可以执行预定的深远迂回任务，配属给他们的虎式坦克连被掉给了进攻路程相对较短的希特勒师，跟随派普的部队推进，穿过苏军防线后再与第7装甲师会合。